This paper discusses the issues about the stress testing of banks' credit portfolios. Currently there is no standard methodology to perform stress tests on banks' credit portfolios and no standard to evaluate self-reported stress testing results from banks. Some banks and bank supervisors have attempted to build econometrics models for macro stress tests. These models may provide inconsistent conclusions because of insufficient data available, unstable patterns of association, nonlinear behavior of credit loss in stress conditions, and the relevance of the historical data in calibrating the model parameters. These issues on econometrics models are illustrated with data of Hong Kong in 1997-2007. This period is an unusual stress period for Hong Kong economy, having Asian financial crisis in 1997, burst of internet bubble in 2001 and SARS outbreak in 2003. With the given data, we find that it is challenging to identify suitable models for forecasting. This paper proposes a methodology to estimate history-based stressed probability of default (PD) to complement the use of macro stress tests. By analyzing the default rates of the banking sector, bank supervisors can easily identify the stressed PD of individual banks' credit portfolios. These estimates are also very helpful for bank supervisors to verify those self-reported stressed PD and to compute the capital adequacy ratios of the banks under stress.
Introduction
Stress testing on the risk of credit portfolios is an important task for banks to comply with the Basel II requirements. There is a wide range of practices among financial institutions (see for Data is always a problem in stress testing the risk of credit portfolios. Traditionally banks reported the ratio of nonperforming loans but banks are now required to report PD or default rate measured by "3-month past due". These two sources of information are not the same. As many banks do not have sufficient history of PD for building stress-testing models, this makes stress testing a challenging task.
Some banks claim that they have successfully developed effective methodologies to conduct stress tests and report their stressed loss estimates to bank supervisors. How do bank supervisors verify these estimates? Some bank supervisors may consider the financial soundness of individual banks. Bank supervisors may sum all banks' estimates and evaluate the impact of an economic stress on the banking sector. This comes to a critical question:
How do bank supervisors know whether these stressed loss estimates are consistent and appropriate? So far there is no standard on quantitative validation for stress testing results.
Given a wide range of methodologies used for stress testing, banks may intentionally consider some stress testing frameworks that provide them favorable results. If it happens, bank supervisors will underestimate the stress risk of individual banks and the whole banking sector. Obviously, there should be some yardsticks that help bank supervisors to verify the appropriateness of self-reported stress estimates.
Stress testing results of market risk and credit risk should be treated separately. Global banks have relatively large exposure to market risk because they are active and dominant in global financial trading. Other medium-sized or local commercial banks usually have the stressed loss amount coming from credit exposures. When their credit portfolios are under stress, their loss can be severe. Consider a commercial bank that specializes in providing loans to unrated corporations. Its original PD is 1%. When the market is under severe stress, according to the capital charge equation of the internal-ratings-based (IRB) approach of Basel II, the default rate of its portfolio may go up to 14%. Such a sharp increase in default rate likely imposes serious threats to the financial soundness of the bank because most banks keep their capital adequacy ratio (CAR) at the range from 11% to 15%. Therefore, if bank supervisors were unable to verify the appropriateness of stress test results, the banking system may be very vulnerable in economic downturns.
This paper aims at discussing major issues of performing macro stress tests on banks' credit portfolios and the banking system. Section 2 identifies the limitations of building econometrics models for stress testing credit portfolios. Section 3 illustrates the limitations of macro stress test models with the economic and aggregate data of Hong Kong in 1997 Kong in -2007 Many banks are now required to report their stress test results. How bank supervisors evaluate the appropriateness of these self-reported figures remains to be an unsolved question.
Section 4 proposes a simple methodology to estimate history-based stressed PD for individual banks. The methodology provides an effective tool for bank supervisors to verify self-reported stressed PD provided by individual banks and enables them to evaluate their capital adequacy ratios under stress. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Models on Macro Stress Testing
Previous studies mostly support that macroeconomic conditions affect default rates and credit risk forecasts. Default rate tends to increase in economic downturns (Fama 1986; and Wilson 1997a & b) . Rating agencies tend to behave differently in different economic scenarios (Ferri, Liu and Majnoni 2001; Monfort and Mulder 2000; and Reisen 2000) . Rating downgrades happen more frequently in economic downturns (Bangia, Diebold, Kronimus, Schagen, and Schuermann 2002; and Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto 2000) . Also, a number of theoretical models link macroeconomic factors with credit risk (see the summary of Allen and Saunder 2003) . In order to assess the impact of macroeconomic shocks to the financial sectors, simple models are developed to link write-offs or credit provisions (denoted by Y t ) with macroeconomic factors (denoted by X t ) and their lags (denoted by X k,t ). X k,t may include, among others, GDP growth, real interest rate, stock market return, property index return, and change in unemployment rate. The following are some prevalent models:
In the above models, k (from 1 to n) represents the selected macroeconomic factors and t (from 0 to h) represents the selected time lags. Estimation can be based on simple regression with lags, vector autoregressive regression, seemingly unrelated regression, co-integration analysis and others. Generally, these models have the following limitations:
(1) The models study mainly the impact of macroeconomic factors on the aggregate credit quality in the banking sector as a whole. They do not evaluate their impact on individual banks. Usually, under an economic stress, banks with high risk credit portfolios and/or poor risk management systems will have strong hit. This may trigger off settlement and liquidity issues in the banking system. What bank supervisors need to do is to find out the particular banks that are more sensitive to economic stress and exercise tighter controls on them, such as higher capital requirements.
(2) The parameters in the models tend to be biased towards good or normal economic conditions. This is because a severe economic stress may happen once every 10 years.
Only 10% of data used for estimation represents data under economic stress. This means, the models may underestimate the sensitivity of credit risk to economic stress.
(3) The models are assumed to follow some linear patterns. However, the impact of macroeconomic variables in a stress scenario may be totally explosive. Default rate can rise sharply in stress conditions. 
Can Econometrics Models Work? Some Issues in Hong Kong
Let's illustrate the above limitations of macro stress tests with the data in Hong Kong. The In Oct 1997, the Hong Kong dollar was strongly hit by a few global hedge funds. Then the stock market immediately declined by more than 50% and rebounded in December 1998. The property price index declined by more than 30% within 3 months after the incidence and kept on falling until September 2003. The number of unemployed persons rose sharply to its first peak in September 1999. Then it drops for several quarters and rose again to its second peak in September 2003. The nominal GDP had relatively stable behavior in the post-crisis period.
The default rate started at 2.17% in March 1997 and hit its peak at 7.39% in September 1999.
Then it fell gradually and consistently in the subsequent quarters.
The movements of the above time series provide some interesting implications on building econometrics models. Economic shocks on credit quality may have long-lasting lagged impact. The economic crisis in the last quarter of 1997 resulted in the highest default rate in September 1999. This lagged effect on credit quality lasted for around 2 years. This may be explained by the progressively cumulative impact of economic shocks on firms' business decisions and the labor market. When there were economic downturns, firms had their profitability decreased. Some firms then announced bankruptcy and some surviving firms cut costs by lying off employees and scaling down their investments. This process may take 1 to 2 years, gradually driving up the default rates of corporate credits, residential mortgages and other retail credits. On the other hand, the impact of economic downturns could be 
Chart 1 Default Rates and Macroeconomic Variables of Hong Kong (1997-2007)
The continuous fall in default rate after March 1999 was partly due to banks tightening their lending policies. In response to the high default rate after the Asian financial crisis, many banks in Hong Kong deliberately reduced lending to risky clients, scaled down their credit lines offered to individual borrowers, and re-allocated the investments to low-risk securities.
These chain reactions from banks would make an econometric model unstable.
Comparing the movements of the macroeconomic variables and the default rates in the above three stressed situations, we can easily identify no consistent pattern of association between default rate and the macrofactors. Although Wong, Choi and Fong (2006) 
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Kong, it is difficult to conduct any cross-validation on these models and to perform any outof-sample test on their predictive accuracy.
All these modeling problems not only apply to Hong Kong but also to other Asian economies suffering from the crisis in 1997. For economies with higher degree of economic instability and/or frequent changes in government policies, econometric modeling usually suffers from similar problems. Given these constraints, how can analysts predict stressed PDs and stressed loss of the credit portfolios for individual banks and the banking system?
History-based Stressed PD
The above section highlights the issues of econometric methods in stress testing. This hints that bank supervisors will find it hard to verify statistically whether banks provide appropriate stressed loss estimates. An alternative that bank supervisors can consider is history-based default rates under stress. Using these figures as stressed PD is less arguable.
Banks would accept that they should consider the worst scenario in their own history. This paper applies the data of Hong Kong to illustrate how this methodology works. The first column of Table 1 shows the actual default rate in Hong Kong in 1997-2007. The first value is the median default rate of the Hong Kong banking sector. This can be treated as the PD*, the long-run PD of the banking sector. Its corresponding default threshold will be Q* = G(PD*) = -1.93.
The maximum default rate in the period 7.39%, which can be treaded as the history-based stressed PD. Some may define stressed PD in other ways, such as highest PD at the confidence level of 95%, 99%, and 99.9%. These stressed PDs are 7.04%, 7.27% and 7.38% respectively (shown in the first column). Obviously stressed PD* at 99%, 99. There are six hypothetical banks, B01 to B06. Each has its PD j and default threshold (Q j ).
Some are low-risk (i.e. low PD) and some are high-risk (i.e. high PD). Assume that the stressed PD* of the banking sector t is 7.29% in the recent history and the long-run PD is The last column R is the correlation estimated with the equation provided by Basel II document.
As bank supervisors roughly know the PD of a bank is known, they can compared its selfreported stressed PD with both the history-based stressed PD and IRB stressed PD. Bank supervisors may expect self-reported stressed PD higher than the history-based stressed PD.
It is because history might repeat itself. Its IRB stressed PD is 21.48%. Both the history-based stressed PD and IRB stressed PD provide very useful references for bank supervisors to verify self-reported stressed PD of individual banks. The former one is a realistic and empirical estimate of credit risk under a stress condition in the history, while the latter one is inferred from a theoretical model. Commercial banks may rely on their internal models to determine their stressed PD. This aims to encourage their enhancement on their risk management analysis. Bank supervisors may build econometrics models to forecast future credit quality of the banking sector.
However, both the history-based stressed PD and IRB stressed PD should not be ignored because of the following reasons: (c) For a new bank or a bank having substantially changes in their risk appetite, bank supervisors can assign an appropriate PD level and compute its history-based stressed PD.
The PD assignment can be based on benchmarking with banks of similar risk profile.
This enables bank supervisors to assess the risk of a bank with very limited information.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed the issues about stress testing risk of credit portfolios. Currently there is no standard methodology to perform macro stress tests and no standard to evaluate self-reported stressed estimates. Some banks and bank supervisors have attempted to build econometrics models for macro stress tests. These models may provide inconsistent conclusions because of insufficient data available, unstable patterns of association, nonlinear behavior of credit loss in stress conditions, and the relevance of the historical data in calibrating the model parameters. These issues on econometrics modeling have been With the given data, we find it is challenging to identify suitable models for forecasting stressed PDs.
The paper has proposed a methodology to estimate history-based stressed PD to complement the use of macro stress tests. History-based stressed PD is based on the peak default rate observed in recent history of the banking sector. This estimate can be easily converted to the stressed PD for individual banks as long as bank supervisors know the default rate of the banks' credit portfolios. With the estimates on history-based stressed PDs, bank supervisors easily verify those self-reported stressed PDs and compute the capital adequacy ratios of all banks under stress.
The discussion in this paper has not covered LGD. Some bank supervisors have set LGD = 45% for corporate credits if banks following foundation IRB. The LGD in Advanced IRB approach is a downturn LGD. Bank supervisors can rely on the LGD or average write-offs given default to calculate stressed loss.
